Abstract
Court articulates for overruling earlier interpretations, who advocates a change in the established case-law and who benefits from the new interpretations.
The Court's attitude towards precedent
In the mid-1980s an official within the Registry of the original, part-time, Court expressed the personal view that:
"With regard to the precedent value of the judgments in later cases before the Court itself, it is clear from the reasons advanced by the Court and the frequent references therein to previous judgments that the Court in its practice adheres to a limited doctrine of stare decisis, even though it is not an absolute doctrine; as appears from, e.g., Rule 50 of the new Rules of Court 3 , the Court does not exclude the possibility of deviating from an earlier case-law. However, according to this Rule, a reversal of an earlier caselaw should be made by the Plenary Court and not by a Chamber." "Continental European observers often stress that the English system is too rigid. They may overlook that there are important exceptions to the rule of stare decisis; that common law judges tend to reason prudently upwards from the facts of a case, whereas Continental judges are inclined to reason sweepingly downwards from abstract 3 Rule 50 of the Rules of Court issued in 1983 provided: "Where a case pending before a Chamber raises one or more serious questions affecting the interpretation of the Convention, the Chamber may, at any time during the proceedings, relinquish jurisdiction in favour of the plenary Court. The relinquishment of jurisdiction shall be obligatory where the resolution of such question or questions might have a result inconsistent with a judgement previously delivered by a Chamber or the plenary Court. Reasons need not be given for the decision to relinquish."
principles... English observers, by contrast, may be mislead by Continental European writers and courts who assert dogmatically that they acknowledge no doctrine of precedent; that only a series of court decisions can acquire binding force, presumably because it must form customary law; and that the courts are no legislators, nor should they be. Again, such a view is lopsided. It overlooks that, as a matter of fact, Continental European courts normally and regularly observe precedents, their own as well as those of superior courts." 6 Against the backdrop of this mutual misunderstanding he disclosed that:
"Discussions inside the European Court of Human Rights relatively often reveal disagreements as to whether an earlier precedent should be followed. This is not surprising in an international court with so many different legal orders and traditions." 7 However, in his opinion:
"...I would suggest that precedents are followed regularly, but not invariably, that "for the sake of attaining uniformity, consistency and certainty", precedents should normally be observed, where "they are not plainly unreasonable and inconvenient" (Mirehouse 16 -may constitute just as valid a precedent as a line of lesser cases; that precedents should normally be followed even before the existence of actual customary law can be demonstrated; and that sound judicial caution requires that the underlying rationale of a case should not be defined so as to be too far detached from the specific facts." At about the same time, Professor David Feldman examined the application of the principle of stare decisis in the jurisprudence of the Court and concluded that: "Decisions of the Court represent authoritative interpretations of the ECHR under social and moral conditions and the state of scientific knowledge current at the time of the decision. They are usually followed, because that is, "in the interests of legal certainty and the orderly development of the Convention case-law."
18 Nevertheless, the Court may subsequently decide that its earlier interpretation was simply erroneous, or may have other "cogent reasons" for changing its interpretation, including the need to "ensure that the interpretation of the Convention reflects societal changes and remains in line with present day conditions". 19 ...There is no real distinction drawn by the Court between ratio decidendi and obiter dictum in its previous pronouncements. All statements are regarded as sources of enlightenment as to the meaning of the ECHR. 20 Professor Feldman considered that the Court's role as "a tribunal of public international law" 21 committed to interpreting a human rights treaty in a dynamic manner 22 were crucial elements underlying the Court's attitude towards the doctrine of precedent.
More recently, in a comparative study of the use of precedent by the International
Court of Justice and the Court, Michael Balcerzak endorsed the view that:
"It remains perfectly clear that the doctrine of stare decisis does not apply in the ECHR system, and it follows that the doctrine of binding precedent (precedent de jure) must be rejected. However, the Court deliberately develops its case-law along the doctrine of non-binding precedent, being guided by convincing reasons, such as the principle of legal safety and orderly development of case-law." "78. ...The forms of procedure required by the Convention need not, however, necessarily be identical in each of the cases where the intervention of a court is required. In order to determine whether a proceeding provides adequate guarantees, regard must be had to the particular nature of the circumstances in which such proceeding takes place. Thus, in the Neumeister case, the Court considered that the competent courts remained "courts" in spite of the lack of "equality of arms" between the prosecution and an individual who requested provisional release (ibidem); nevertheless, the same might not be true in a different context and, for example, in another situation which is also governed by Article 5(4 1984) ...) the Court found that the auditeurmilitair, who had ordered the detention of the applicants, could also be called upon to assume, in the same case, the role of prosecuting authority after referral of the case to the Military Court. It concluded from this that he could not be "independent of the parties" at that preliminary stage precisely because he was "liable" to become one of the parties at the next stage in the procedure.
43. The Court sees no ground for reaching a different conclusion in this case as regards criminal justice under the ordinary law. Clearly the Convention does not rule out the possibility of the judicial officer who orders the detention carrying out other duties, but his impartiality is open to doubt...if he is entitled to intervene in the subsequent criminal proceedings as a representative of the prosecuting authority.
Since that was the situation in the present case, there has been a breach of Article 5(3)."
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President Wildhaber described this judgment as the Court "indirectly" overruling Schiesser whilst noting that the Court "refused to speak of an "overruling"". 37 So even when the Court was effectively pronouncing a complete reversal of its previous interpretation of a Convention provision the judges sought to mask this by not expressly acknowledging that they were overruling their earlier case-law.
One year later the plenary Court adopted the same strategy when it implicitly overruled its previous acceptance of the Belgian avocat general, a member of the procureur general's department, having the last word on whether an appeal should be allowed by the "28. Further and above all, the inequality was increased even more by the avocat general's participation in an advisory capacity, in the Court's deliberations. Assistance of this nature, given with total objectivity, may be of some use in drafting judgments, although this task falls in the first place to the Court of Cassation itself. It is however hard to see how such assistance can remain limited to stylistic considerations, which are in case often indissociable from substantive matters, if it is in addition intended, as the Government also affirmed, to contribute towards maintaining the consistency of the case-law. Even if such assistance was so limited in the present case, it could reasonably be thought that the deliberations afforded the avocat general an additional opportunity to promote, without fear of contradiction by the applicant, his submissions to the effect that the appeal should be dismissed. 29. In conclusion, having regard to the requirements of the rights of the defence and of the principle of the equality of arms and to the role of appearances in determining whether they have been complied with, the Court finds a violation of Article 6(1 
The justifications advanced by the Court for overruling previous judgments
The existence of "uncertainty" in the existing case-law has been invoked several times by the The Court noted that its previous case-law had established that generally disputes concerning the recruitment, careers and termination of employment of civil servants fell outside Article 6(1). But, a number of judgments had limited that principle of exclusion. The new test for determining if particular civil servants could claim the protection of Article 6(1) should be:
"...in order for the respondent State to be able to rely before the Court on the applicant's status as a civil servant in excluding the protection embodied in Article 6, two conditions must be fulfilled. Firstly, the State in its national law must have expressly excluded access to a court for the post or category of staff in question. Secondly, the exclusion must be justified on objective grounds in the State's interest. The mere fact that the applicant is in a sector or department which participates in the exercise of power conferred by public law is not in itself decisive. In order for the exclusion to be justified, it is not enough for the State to establish that the civil servant in question participates in the exercise of public power or that there exists, to use the words of the Court in the Pellegrin judgment, a "special bond of trust and loyalty" between the civil 50 ibid. at para. 51. 51 ibid.
servant and the State, as employer. It is also for the State to show that the subject matter of the dispute in issue is related to the exercise of State power or that it has called into question the special bond. Thus, there can in principle be no justification for the exclusion from the guarantees of Article 6 of ordinary labour disputes, such as those relating to salaries, allowances or similar entitlements, on the basis of the special nature of relationship between the particular civil servant and the State in question. There will, in effect, be a presumption that Article 6 applies. It will be for the respondent Government to demonstrate, first, that a civil-servant applicant does not have a right of access to a court under national law and, second, that the exclusion of the rights under Article 6 for the civil servant is justified."
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Applying this new methodology the Court held that as all the applicants had a right of access to a court under Finnish law to determine their employment disputes so Article 6(1) was applicable to them. By fourteen votes to three the Grand Chamber then found that the domestic first instance proceedings had exceeded the reasonable time guarantee under that Article.
The current President of the Court joined by his predecessor and three other judges issued a dissenting opinion which criticised the analysis of the majority and its approach to precedent.
"6. In any event, we fail to see what theoretical or practical necessity required the Court to abandon the Pellegrin case-law in the present case. It has been applied by the Court for seven years without any real problem and, as could have been expected and desired, it has extended rather than restricted the application of the guarantees secured under Article 6 § 1. The categories of agents excluded from these guarantees, such as the police service in its entirety, are limited when compared with public service employees as a whole... Legal certainty has certainly improved if we compare the situation with that which obtained prior to the Pellegrin judgment. As to the argument based on the existence of access to a domestic court, we are not convinced by it. As Article 53 of the Convention rightly points out, nothing prevents a High Contracting Party from recognising in its law freedoms or guarantees which go further than those set forth in the Convention; in addition, as legal systems vary from one State to another, the reasoning in the instant judgment is likely to have the effect of making the applicability of Article 6 § 1 to disputes between the State and its agents dependent on there existing access to a court with jurisdiction to decide them within the domestic legal system. To sum up, instead of the "autonomous interpretation" (by the Court) that the latter considered it important to establish for the purposes of Article 6 § 1 (see the Pellegrin judgment, § 63), the instant judgment encourages a dependent and variable, not to say uncertain, interpretation, in other words an arbitrary one. In our opinion, this is an inappropriate step back. 7. In conclusion, the Court has overturned its well-established case-law. Admittedly, it is entitled to do so (even if the case-law in question is relatively recent). In general, however, the Court takes this step where there are new developments and where a new need arises. This is not the case here. Abandoning a solid precedent in such conditions creates legal uncertainty and, in our opinion, will make it difficult for the States to identify the extent of their obligations." "148. In the Court's view, the time has come to review its case-law in the light of the continuing accumulation of applications before it in which the only, or principal, allegation is that of a failure to ensure a hearing within a reasonable time in breach of Article 6(1).
The growing frequency with which violations in this regard are being found has recently led the Court to draw attention to "the important danger" that exists for the rule of law within national legal orders when "excessive delays in the administration of justice" occur "in respect of which litigants have no domestic remedy"...
149. Against this background, the Court does now perceive the need to examine the applicant's complaint under Article 13 taken separately, in addition to its earlier finding of a violation of Article 6(1) for failure to try him within a reasonable time."
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The Grand Chamber adopted this new interpretation of Article 13, requiring States to establish effective domestic remedies to deal with complaints of unreasonable delay in court proceedings, because the previous approach was forcing applicants to bring their Article 6(1) unreasonable delay complaints to Strasbourg rather than having them resolved domestically.
The Grand Chamber believed that the earlier approach threatened the long-term efficient functioning of the Convention's protection system. Judge Casadevall did not think "that it was necessary for the Court to depart from precedent" 59 in altering its interpretation of Article questioning amounted to torture. The Commission considered that the abuse was sufficiently serious to be so classified. However, before the Court the French government contended that applying existing case-law the abuse did not attain the gravity of torture. This was disputed by the Dutch government. The Grand Chamber held that:
"...having regard to the fact that the Convention is a "living instrument instrument which must be interpreted in the light of present-day conditions"...the Court considers that certain acts which were classified in the past as "inhuman and degrading treatment" as opposed to "torture" could be classified differently in future. It takes the view that the increasingly high standard being required in the area of the protection of human rights and fundamental liberties correspondingly and inevitably requires greater firmness in assessing breaches of the fundamental values of democratic societies." "The point made by the Court suggests that since the Delcourt judgment there have been "societal changes" in this respect which warrant overruling. Thus it echoes a similar observation made during the hearing before the Court by counsel for the applicant. Counsel provided no specific grounds for his suggestion that since the Delcourt judgment there had been an evolution in this respect. Neither does the Court. It merely refers to its case-law; but there one will look in vain for a factual basis for the alleged "increased sensitivity of the public". Whereas Judge Thomassen, joined by Judges Casadevall and Klover, rejected the view that there had been any important developments in the common law:
The majority's reasons for not following the decisions in Osman are not, to my mind, convincing. There seem to have been no striking or significant changes in the law of negligence since that case and all relevant matters concerning the content of domestic law had been brought to the attention of the Court by the parties in Osman. I am of the opinion that the conclusion under Article 6 in this case must be the same.
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Hence assessing the existence and extent of potentially subtle evolutions in domestic private law regimes may be problematic for a supra-national human rights tribunal.
Most recently a unanimous Grand Chamber utilised a combination of developments in international and national law, together with the practice of member States to justify overruling, or as the Court described it "reconsidered", the long- However, whilst agreeing that Article 11 had been breached, Judge Zagrebelsky stated that:
I have the feeling that the Court's departure from precedent represents a correction of its previous case-law rather than an adaptation of case-law to a real change, at European or domestic level, in the legislative framework (as was the case, for example , in its Stafford v UK judgment) or in the relevant social and cultural ethos (as, for example, in Christine Goodwin v UK).
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The potentially significant extension of the scope of Article 11 being articulated by the Grand
Chamber may explain why so many different bases for applying the evolutive approach were invoked by the Court.
We have now discovered that the full-time Court has utilised a number of different justifications for overruling established case-law. These include the need to resolve uncertainty in the jurisprudence, which we have seen is a double-edged tool that can be used by both judges who wish to alter precedent and those who wish to affirm existing case-law.
However, the justification invoked most frequently by the Court is the duty to ensure that the Convention is interpreted in an evolutionary manner that reflects contemporary standards in accordance with the living instrument doctrine. substantive rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention. Hence, the Court ought to be more transparent in openly acknowledging when it is revising and altering its existing caselaw. At present it is often left to the dissenting judges to expressly describe the Court's judgment as constituting an overruling of precedent. 125 In addition the Court should ensure that it provides adequate justification in respect of the changed social conditions/values or scientific knowledge that underpins an overruling judgment, as we have noted that has not always been the practice of the Court. 126 Today the Court has sufficient maturity to enable it to frankly address the topic of the overruling of previous case-law as discussed in our study.
